PRESIDENT GROVER CLEVELAND'S MESSAGE

December 18, 1893

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

In my recent annual message to the Congress I briefly referred to our relations with

Hawaii and expressed the intention of transmitting further information on the

subject when additional advices permitted.

Though I am not able now to report a definite change in the actual situation, I am

convinced that the difficulties lately created both here and in Hawaii and now

standing in the way of a solution through Executive action of the problem

presented, render it proper and expedient, that the matter should be referred to the

broader authority and discretion of Congress, with a full explanation of the

endeavor thus far made to deal with the emergency and a statement of the

considerations which have governed my action.

I suppose that right and justice should determine the path to be followed in treating

this subject. If national honesty is to be disregarded and a desire for territorial

extension, or dissatisfaction with a form of government not our own, ought to

regulate our conduct, I have entirely misapprehended the mission and character of

our Government and the behavior which the conscience of our people demands of

their public servants.

When the present Administration entered upon its duties the Senate had under

consideration a treaty providing for the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the

territory of the United States. Surely under our Constitution and laws the

enlargement of our limits is a manifestation of the highest attribute of sovereignty,

and if entered upon as an Executive act, all things relating to the transaction should

be clear and free from suspicion. Additional importance attached to this particular

treaty of annexation, because it contemplated a departure from unbroken American

tradition in providing for the addition to our territory of islands of the sea more

than two thousand miles removed from our nearest coast.

These considerations might not of themselves call for interference with the

completion of a treaty entered upon by a previous Administration. but it appeared

from the documents accompanying the treaty when submitted to the Senate, that

the ownership of Hawaii was tendered to us by a provisional government set up to

succeed the constitutional ruler of the islands, who had been dethroned, and it did

not appear that such provisional government had the sanction of either popular

revolution or suffrage. Two other remarkable features of the transaction naturally

attracted attention. One was the extraordinary haste - not to say precipitancy -

characterizing all the transactions connected with the treaty. It appeared that a

so-called Committee of Safety, ostensibly the source of the revolt against the

constitutional Government of Hawaii, was organized on Saturday, the 14th day of

January; that on Monday, the 16th, the United States forces were landed at

Honolulu from a naval vessel lying in its harbor; that on the 17th the scheme of a

provisional government was perfected, and a proclamation naming its officers was

on the same day prepared and read at the Government building; that immediately

thereupon the United States Minister recognized the provisional government thus

created; that two days afterwards, on the 19th day of January, commissioners

representing such government sailed for this country in a steamer especially

chartered for the occasion, arriving in San Francisco on the 28th day of January,

and in Washington on the 3rd day of February; that on the next day they had their

first interview with the Secretary of State, and another on the 11th, when the treaty

of annexation was practically agreed upon, and that on the 14th it was formally

concluded and on the 15th transmitted to the Senate. Thus between the initiation of

the scheme for a provisional government in Hawaii on the 14th day of January and

the submission to the Senate of the treaty of annexation concluded with such

government, the entire interval was thirty-two days, fifteen of which were spent by

the Hawaiian Commissioners in their journey to Washington.

In the next place, upon the face of the papers submitted with the treaty, it clearly

appeared that there was open and undetermined an issue of fact of the most vital

importance. The message of the President accompanying the treaty declared that

"the overthrow of the monarchy was not in any way promoted by this

Government," and in a letter to the President from the Secretary of State also

submitted to the Senate with the treaty, the following message occurs: "At the time

the provisional government took possession of the Government buildings no troops

or officers of the United States were present or took any part whatever in the

proceedings. No public recognition was accorded to the provisional government by

the United States Minister until after the Queen's abdication and when they were in

effective possession of the Government buildings, the archives, the treasury, the

barracks, the police station, and all the potential machinery of the Government."

But a protest also accompanied said treaty, signed by the Queen and her ministers

at the time she made way for the provisional government, which explicitly stated

that she yielded to the superior force of the United States, whose Minister had

caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would

support such provisional government.

The truth or falsity of this protest was surely of the first importance. If true,

nothing but the concealment of its truth could induce our Government to negotiate

with the semblance of a government thus created, nor could a treaty resulting from

the acts stated in the protest have been knowingly deemed worthy of consideration

by the Senate. Yet the truth or falsity of the protest had not been investigated.

I conceived it to be my duty therefore to withdraw the treaty from the Senate for

examination, and meanwhile to cause an accurate, full, and impartial investigation

to be made of the facts attending the subversion of the constitutional Government

of Hawaii and the installment in its place of the provisional government. I selected

for the work of investigation the Hon. James H. Blount, of Georgia, whose service

of eighteen years as a member of the House of Georgia, and whose experience as

chairman of the Committee of Foreign Affairs in that body, and his consequent

familiarity with international topics, joined with his high character and honorable

reputation, seemed to render him peculiarly fitted for the duties entrusted to him.

His report detailing his action under the instructions given to him and the

conclusions derived from his investigation accompany this message.

These conclusions do not rest for their acceptance entirely upon Mr. Blount's

honesty and ability as a man, nor upon his acumen and impartiality as an

investigator. They are accompanied by the evidence upon which they are based,

which evidence is also herewith transmitted, and from which it seems to me no

other deductions could possibly be reached than those arrived at by the

Commissioner.

The report with its accompanying proofs, and such other evidence as is now before

the Congress or is herewith submitted, justifies in my opinion the statement that

when the President was led to submit the treaty to the Senate with the declaration

that "the overthrow of the monarchy was not in any way promoted by this

Government", and when the Senate was induced to receive and discuss it on that

basis, both President and Senate were misled.

The attempt will not be made in this communication to touch upon all the facts

which throw light upon the progress and consummation of this scheme of

annexation. A very brief and imperfect reference to the facts and evidence at hand

will exhibit its character and the incidents in which it had its birth.

It is unnecessary to set forth the reasons which in January, 1893, led a

considerable proportion of American and other foreign merchants and traders

residing at Honolulu to favor the annexation of Hawaii to the United States. It is

sufficient to note the fact and to observe that the project was one which was

zealously promoted by the Minister representing the United States in that country.

He evidently had an ardent desire that it should become a fact accomplished by his

agency and during his ministry, and was not inconveniently scrupulous as to the

means employed to that end. On the 19th day of November, 1892, nearly two

months before the first overt act tending towards the subversion of the Hawaiian

Government and the attempted transfer of Hawaiian territory to the United States,

he addressed a long letter to the Secretary of State in which the case for annexation

was elaborately argued, on moral, political, and economical grounds. He refers to

the loss of the Hawaiian sugar interests from the operation of the McKinley bill,

and the tendency to still further depreciation of sugar property unless some positive

measure of relief is granted. He strongly inveighs against the existing Hawaiian

Government and emphatically declares for annexation. He says: "In truth the

monarchy here is an absurd anachronism. It has nothing on which it logically or

legitimately stands. The feudal basis on which it once stood no longer existing, the

monarchy now is only an impediment to good government - an obstruction to the

prosperity and progress of the islands."

He further says: "As a crown colony of Great Britain or a Territory of the United

States the government modifications could be made readily and good

administration of the law secured. Destiny and the vast future interests of the

United States in the Pacific clearly indicate who at no distant day must be

responsible for the government of these islands. Under a territorial government

they could be as easily governed as any of the existing Territories of the United

States." * * * "Hawaii has reached the parting of the ways. She must now take the

road which leads to Asia, or the other which outlets her in America, gives her an

American civilization, and binds her to the care of American destiny." He also

declares: "One of two courses seems to me absolutely necessary to be followed,

either bold and vigorous measures for annexation or a 'customs union," an ocean

cable from the Californian coast to Honolulu, Pearl Harbor perpetually ceded to the

United States, with an implied but not expressly stipulated American protectorate

over the islands. I believe the former to be the better, that which will prove much

the more advantageous to the islands, and the cheapest and least embarrassing in

the end to the United States. If it was wise for the United States through Secretary

Marcy thirty-eight years ago to offer to expend $100,000 to secure a treaty of

annexation, it certainly can not be chimerical or unwise to expend $100,000 to

secure annexation in the near future. To-day the United States has five times the

wealth she possessed in 1854, and the reasons now existing for annexation are

much stronger than they were then. I can not refrain from expressing the opinion

with emphasis that the golden hour is near at hand."

These declarations certainly show a disposition and condition of mind, which may

be usefully recalled when interpreting the significance of the Minister's conceded

acts or when considering the probabilities of such conduct on his part as may not

be admitted.

In this view it seems proper to also quote from a letter written by the Minister to

the Secretary of State on the 8th day of March, 1892, nearly a year prior to the

first step taken toward annexation. After stating the possibility that the existing

Government of Hawaii might be overturned by an orderly and peaceful revolution,

Minister Stevens writes as follows: "Ordinarily in like circumstances, the rule seems

to be to limit the landing and movement of United States forces in foreign waters

and dominion exclusively to the protection of the United States legation and of the

lives and property of American citizens. But as the relations of the United States to

Hawaii are exceptional, and in former years the United States officials here took

somewhat exceptional action in circumstances of disorder, I desire to know how

far the present Minister and naval commander may deviate from established

international rules and precedents in the contingencies indicated in the first part of

this dispatch."

To a minister of this temper full of zeal for annexation there seemed to arise in

January, 1893, the precise opportunity for which he was watchfully waiting - an

opportunity which by timely "deviation from established international rules and

precedents" might be improved to successfully accomplish the great object in view;

and we are quite prepared for the exultant enthusiasm with which in a letter to the

State Department dated February 1, 1893, he declares: "The Hawaiian pear is now

fully ripe and this is the golden hour for the United States to pluck it."

As a further illustration of the activity of this diplomatic representative, attention is

called to the fact that on the day the above letter was written, apparently unable

longer to restrain his ardor, he issued a proclamation whereby "in the name of the

United States" he assumed the protection of the Hawaiian Islands and declared that

said action was "taken pending and subject to negotiations at Washington." Of

course this assumption of a protectorate was promptly disavowed by our

Government, but the American flag remained over the Government building at

Honolulu and the forces remained on guard until April, and after Mr. Blount's

arrival on the scene, when both were removed.

A brief statement of the occurrences that led to the subversion of the constitutional

Government of Hawaii in the interests of annexation to the United States will

exhibit the true complexion of that transaction.

On Saturday, January 14, 1893, the Queen of Hawaii, who had been

contemplating the proclamation of a new constitution, had, in deference to the

wishes and remonstrances of her cabinet, renounced the project for the present at

least. Taking this relinquished purpose as a basis of action, citizens of Honolulu

numbering from fifty to one hundred, mostly resident aliens, met in a private office

and selected a so-called Committee of Safety, composed of thirteen persons, seven

of whom were foreign subjects, and consisted of five Americans, one Englishman,

and one German. This committee, though its designs were not revealed, had in

view nothing less than annexation to the United States, and between Saturday, the

14th, and the following Monday, the 16th of January - though exactly what action

was taken may not be clearly disclosed -they were certainly in communication with

the United States Minister. On Monday morning the Queen and her cabinet made

public proclamation, with a notice which was specially served upon the

representatives of all foreign governments, that any changes in the constitution

would be sought only in the methods provided by that instrument. Nevertheless, at

the call and under the auspices of the Committee of Safety, a mass meeting of

citizens was held on that day to protest against the Queen's alleged illegal and

unlawful proceedings and purposes. Even at this meeting the Committee of Safety

continued to disguise their real purpose and contented themselves with procuring

the passage of a resolution denouncing the Queen and empowering the committee

to devise ways and means "to secure the permanent maintenance of law and order

and the protection of life, liberty, and property in Hawaii." This meeting adjourned

between three and four o'clock in the afternoon. On the same day, and

immediately after such adjournment, the committee, unwilling to take further steps

without the cooperation of the United States Minister, addressed him a note

representing that the public safety was menaced and that lives and property were in

danger, and concluded as follows: "We are unable to protect ourselves without aid,

and therefore pray for the protection of the United States forces." Whatever may

be thought of the other contents of this note, the absolute truth of this latter

statement is incontestable. When the note was written and delivered, the

committee, so far as it appears, had neither a man or a gun at their command, and

after its delivery they became so panic-stricken at their stricken position that they

sent some of their number to interview the Minister and request him not to land the

United States forces till the next morning. But he replied that the troops had been

ordered, and whether the committee were ready or not the landing should take

place. And so it happened that on the 16th day of January, 1893, between four and

five o'clock in the afternoon, a detachment of marines from the United States

Steamer Boston, with two pieces of artillery, landed at Honolulu. The men,

upwards of 160 in all, were supplied with double cartridge belts filled with

ammunition and with haversacks and canteens, and were accompanied by a

hospital corps with stretchers and medical supplies. This military demonstration

upon the soil of Honolulu was of itself an act of war, unless made either with the

consent of the Government of Hawaii or for the bona fide purpose of protecting

the imperilled lives and property of citizens of the United States. But there is no

pretense of any such consent on the part of the Government of the Queen, which

at that time was undisputed and was both the de facto and the de jure government.

In point of fact the existing government instead of requesting the presence of an

armed force protested against it. There is as little basis for the pretense that such

forces were landed for the security of American life and property. If so, they

would have been stationed in the vicinity of such property and so as to protect it,

instead of at a distance and so as to command the Hawaiian Government building

and palace. Admiral Skerrett, the officer in command of our naval force on the

Pacific station, has frankly stated that in his opinion the location of the troops was

inadvisable if they were landed for the protection of American citizens whose

residences and places of business, as well as the legation and consulate, were in a

distant part of the city, but the location selected was a wise one if the forces were

landed for the purpose of supporting the provisional government. If any peril to life

and property calling for any such martial array had existed, Great Britain and other

foreign powers interested would not have been behind the United States in activity

to protect their citizens. But they made no sign in that direction. When these armed

men were landed, the city of Honolulu was in its customary orderly and peaceful

condition. There was no symptom of riot or disturbance in any quarter. Men,

women, and children were about the streets as usual, and nothing varied the

ordinary routine or disturbed the ordinary tranquility, except the landing of the

Boston's marines and their march through the town to the quarters assigned them.

Indeed, the fact that after having called for the landing of the United States forces

on the plea of danger to life and property the Committee of Safety themselves

requested the Minister to postpone action, exposed the untruthfulness of their

representations of present peril to life and property. The peril they saw was an

anticipation growing out of guilty intentions on their part and something which,

though not then existing, they knew would certainly follow their attempt to

overthrow the Government of the Queen without the aid of the United States

forces.

Thus it appears that Hawaii was taken possession of by the United States forces

without the consent or wish of the government of the islands, or of anybody else

so far as shown, except the United States Minister.

Therefore the military occupation of Honolulu by the United States on the day

mentioned was wholly without justification, either as an occupation by consent or

as an occupation necessitated by dangers threatening American life and property. It

must be accounted for in some other way and on some other ground, and its real

motive and purpose are neither obscure nor far to seek.

The United States forces being now on the scene and favorably stationed, the

committee proceeded to carry out their original scheme. They met the next

morning, Tuesday, the 17th, perfected the plan of temporary government, and

fixed upon its principal officers, ten of whom were drawn from the thirteen

members of the Committee of Safety. Between one and two o'clock, by squads

and by different routes to avoid notice, and having first taken the precaution of

ascertaining whether there was any one there to oppose them, they proceeded to

the Government building to proclaim the new government. No sign of opposition

was manifest, and thereupon an American citizen began to read the proclamation

from the steps of the Government building almost entirely without auditors. It is

said that before the reading was finished quite a concourse of persons, variously

estimated at from 50 to 100, some armed and some unarmed, gathered about the

committee to give them aid and confidence. This statement is not important, since

the one controlling factor in the whole affair was unquestionably the United States

marines, who, drawn up under arms and with artillery in readiness only seventy-six

yards distant, dominated the situation.

The provisional government thus proclaimed was by the terms of the proclamation

"to exist until terms of union with the United States had been negotiated and agreed

upon". The United States Minister, pursuant to prior agreement, recognized this

government within an hour after the reading of the proclamation, and before five

o'clock, in answer to an inquiry on behalf of the Queen and her cabinet, announced

that he had done so.

When our Minister recognized the provisional government the only basis upon

which it rested was the fact that the Committee of Safety had in the manner above

stated declared it to exist. It was neither a government de facto nor de jure. That it

was not in such possession of the Government property and agencies as entitled it

to recognition is conclusively proved by a note found in the files of the Legation at

Honolulu, addressed by the declared head of the provisional government to

Minister Stevens, dated January 17, 1893, in which he acknowledges with

expressions of appreciation the Minister's recognition of the provisional

government, and states that it is not yet in the possession of the station house (the

place where a large number of the Queen's troops were quartered), though the

same had been demanded of the Queen's officers in charge. Nevertheless, this

wrongful recognition by our Minister placed the Government of the Queen in a

position of most perilous perplexity. On the one hand she had possession of the

palace, of the barracks, and of the police station, and had at her command at least

five hundred fully armed men and several pieces of artillery. Indeed, the whole

military force of her kingdom was on her side and at her disposal, while the

Committee of Safety, by actual search, had discovered that there were but very

few arms in Honolulu that were not in the service of the Government. In this state

of things if the Queen could have dealt with the insurgents alone her course would

have been plain and the result unmistakable. But the United States had allied itself

with her enemies, had recognized them as the true Government of Hawaii, and had

put her and her adherents in the position of opposition against lawful authority. She

knew that she could not withstand the power of the United States, but she believed

that she might safely trust to its justice. Accordingly, some hours after the

recognition of the provisional government by the United States Minister, the

palace, the barracks, and the police station, with all the military resources of the

country, were delivered up by the Queen upon the representation made to her that

her cause would thereafter be reviewed at Washington, and while protesting that

she surrendered to the superior force of the United States, whose Minister had

caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would

support the provisional government, and that she yielded her authority to prevent

collision of armed forces and loss of life and only until such time as the United

States, upon the facts being presented to it, should undo the action of its

representative and reinstate her in the authority she claimed as the constitutional

sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.

This protest was delivered to the chief of the provisional government, who

endorsed thereon his acknowledgment of its receipt. The terms of the protest were

read without dissent by those assuming to constitute the provisional government,

who were certainly charged with the knowledge that the Queen instead of finally

abandoning her power had appealed to the justice of the United States for

reinstatement in her authority; and yet the provisional government with this

unanswered protest in its hand hastened to negotiate with the United States for the

permanent banishment of the Queen from power and for the sale of her kingdom.

Our country was in danger of occupying the position of having actually set up a

temporary government on foreign soil for the purpose of acquiring through that

agency territory which we had wrongfully put in its possession. The control of both

sides of a bargain acquired in such a manner is called by a familiar and unpleasant

name when found in private transactions. We are not without a precedent showing

how scrupulously we avoided such accusations in former days. After the people of

Texas had declared their independence of Mexico they resolved that on the

acknowledgment of their independence by the United States they would seek

admission into the Union. Several months after the battle of San Jacinto, by which

Texan independence was practically assured and established, President Jackson

declined to recognize it, alleging as one of his reasons that in the circumstances it

became us "to beware of a too early movement, as it might subject us, however

unjustly, to the imputation of seeking to establish the claim of our neighbors to a

territory with a view to its subsequent acquisition by ourselves". This is in marked

contrast with the hasty recognition of a government openly and concededly set up

for the purpose of tendering to us territorial annexation.

I believe that a candid and thorough examination of the facts will force the

conviction that the provisional government owes its existence to an armed invasion

by the United States. Fair-minded people with the evidence before them will hardly

claim that the Hawaiian Government was overthrown by the people of the islands

or that the provisional government had ever existed with their consent. I do not

understand that any member of this government claims that the people would

uphold it by their suffrages if they were allowed to vote on the question.

While naturally sympathizing with every effort to establish a republican form of

government, it has been the settled policy of the United States to concede to people

of foreign countries the same freedom and independence in the management of

their domestic affairs that we have always claimed for ourselves; and it has been

our practice to recognize revolutionary governments as soon as it became apparent

that they were supported by the people. For illustration of this rule I need only to

refer to the revolution in Brazil in 1889, when our Minister was instructed to

recognize the Republic "so soon as a majority of the people of Brazil should have

signified their assent to its establishment and maintenance"; to the revolution in

Chile in 1891, when our Minister was directed to recognize the new government "if

it was accepted by the people"; and to the revolution in Venezuela in 1892, when

our recognition was accorded on condition that the new government was "fully

established, in possession of the power of the nation, and accepted by the people."

As I apprehend the situation, we are brought face to face with the following

conditions:

The lawful Government of Hawaii was overthrown without the drawing of a sword

or the firing of a shot by a process every step of which, it may be safely asserted,

is directly traceable to and dependent for its success upon the agency of the United

States acting through its diplomatic and naval representatives.

But for the notorious predilections of the United States Minister for annexation, the

Committee of Safety, which should be called the Committee of Annexation, would

never have existed.

But for the landing of the United States forces upon false pretexts respecting the

danger to life and property the committee would never have exposed themselves to

the pains and penalties of treason by undertaking the subversion of the Queen's

Government.

But for the presence of the United States forces in the immediate vicinity and in

position to afford all needed protection and support the committee would not have

proclaimed the provisional government from the steps of the Government building.

And finally, but for the lawless occupation of Honolulu under false pretexts by the

United States forces, and but for Minister Stevens' recognition of the provisional

government when the United States forces were its sole support and constituted its

only military strength, the Queen and her Government would never have yielded to

the provisional government, even for a time and for the sole purpose of submitting

her case to the enlightened justice of the United States.

Believing, therefore, that the United States could not, under the circumstances

disclosed, annex the islands without justly incurring the imputation of acquiring

them by unjustifiable methods, I shall not again submit the treaty of annexation to

the Senate for its consideration, and in the instructions to Minister Willis, a copy of

which accompanies this message, I have directed him to so inform the provisional

government.

But in the present instance our duty does not, in my opinion, end with refusing to

consummate this questionable transaction. It has been the boast of our government

that it seeks to do justice in all things without regard to the strength or weakness of

those with whom it deals. I mistake the American people if they favor the odious

doctrine that there is no such thing as international morality, that there is one law

for a strong nation and another for a weak one, and that even by indirection a

strong power may with impunity despoil a weak one of its territory.

By an act of war, committed with the participation of a diplomatic representative of

the United States and without authority of Congress, the Government of a feeble

but friendly and confiding people has been overthrown. A substantial wrong has

thus been done which a due regard for our national character as well as the rights

of the injured people requires we should endeavor to repair. The provisional

government has not assumed a republican or other constitutional form, but has

remained a mere executive council or oligarchy, set up without the assent of the

people. It has not sought to find a permanent basis of popular support and has

given no evidence of an intention to do so. Indeed, the representatives of that

government assert that the people of Hawaii are unfit for popular government and

frankly avow that they can be best ruled by arbitrary or despotic power.

The law of nations is founded upon reason and justice, and the rules of conduct

governing individual relations between citizens or subjects of a civilized state are

equally applicable as between enlightened nations. The considerations that

international law is without a court for its enforcement, and that obedience to its

commands practically depends upon good faith, instead of upon the mandate of a

superior tribunal, only give additional sanction to the law itself and brand any

deliberate infraction of it not merely as a wrong but as a disgrace. A man of true

honor protects the unwritten word which binds his conscience more scrupulously,

if possible, than he does the bond a breach of which subjects him to legal liabilities;

and the United States in aiming to maintain itself as one of the most enlightened of

nations would do its citizens gross injustice if it applied to its international relations

any other than a high standard of honor and morality. On that ground the United

States can not properly be put in the position of countenancing a wrong after its

commission any more than in that of consenting to it in advance. On that ground it

can not allow itself to refuse to redress an injury inflicted through an abuse of

power by officers clothed with its authority and wearing its uniform; and on the

same ground, if a feeble but friendly state is in danger of being robbed of its

independence and its sovereignty by a misuse of the name and power of the United

States, the United States can not fail to vindicate its honor and its sense of justice

by an earnest effort to make all possible reparation.

These principles apply to the present case with irresistible force when the special

conditions of the Queen's surrender of her sovereignty are recalled. She

surrendered not to the provisional government, but to the United States. She

surrendered not absolutely and permanently, but temporarily and conditionally until

such time as the facts could be considered by the United States. Furthermore, the

provisional government acquiesced in her surrender in that manner and on those

terms, not only by tacit consent, but through the positive acts of some members of

that government who urged her peaceable submission, not merely to avoid

bloodshed, but because she could place implicit reliance upon the justice of the

United States, and that the whole subject would be finally considered at

Washington.

I have not, however, overlooked an incident of this unfortunate affair which

remains to be mentioned. The members of the provisional government and their

supporters, though not entitled to extreme sympathy, have been led to their present

predicament of revolt against the Government of the Queen by the indefensible

encouragement and assistance of our diplomatic representative. This fact may

entitle them to claim that in our effort to rectify the wrong committed some regard

should be had for their safety. This sentiment is strongly seconded by my anxiety

to do nothing which would invite either harsh retaliation on the part of the Queen

or violence and bloodshed in any quarter. In the belief that the Queen, as well as

her enemies, would be willing to adopt such a course as would meet these

conditions, and in view of the fact that both the Queen and the provisional

government had at one time apparently acquiesced in a reference of the entire case

to the United States Government, and considering the further fact that in any event

the provisional government by its own declared limitation was only "to exist until

terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed

upon," I hoped that after the assurance to the members of that government that

such union could not be consummated I might compass a peaceful adjustment of

the difficulty.

Actuated by these desires and purposes,and not unmindful of the inherent

perplexities of the situation nor of the limitations upon my power, I instructed

Minister Willis to advise the Queen and her supporters of my desire to aid in the

restoration of the status existing before the lawless landing of the United States

forces at Honolulu on the 16th of January last, if such restoration could be effected

upon terms providing for clemency as well as justice to all parties concerned. The

conditions suggested, as the instructions show, contemplate a general amnesty to

those concerned insetting up the provisional government and a recognition of all its

bona fide acts and obligations. In short, they require that the past should be buried,

and that the restored Government should reassume its authority as if its continuity

had not been interrupted. These conditions have not proved acceptable to the

Queen, and though she has been informed that they will be insisted upon, and that,

unless acceded to, the efforts of the President to aid in the restoration of her

Government will cease, I have not thus far learned that she is willing to yield them

her acquiescence. The check which my plans have thus encountered has prevented

their presentation to the members of the provisional government, while unfortunate

public misrepresentations of the situation and exaggerated statements of the

sentiments of our people have obviously injured the prospects of successful

Executive mediation.

I therefore submit this communication with its accompanying exhibits, embracing

Mr. Bount's report, the evidence and statements taken by him at Honolulu, the

instructions given to both Mr. Blount and Minister Willis, and correspondence

connected with the affair in hand.

In commending this subject to the extended powers and wide discretion of the

Congress, I desire to add the assurance that I shall be much gratified to cooperate

in any legislative plan which may be devised for the solution of the problem before

us which is consistent with American honor, integrity, and morality.

GROVER CLEVELAND

Executive Mansion,

Washington, December 18, 1893